Conditional Divorce Stipulated for a Cause, Then the Cause Ceases

Answer—and Allah is the One who grants success and aid: A divorce suspended on a condition takes effect upon the condition’s occurrence; and the implicit conditions in one’s mind and the qualifying restrictions are also taken into account in this chapter—and in oaths, vows, and the like. Thus they have said.
Accordingly, if the conditional divorce issued only for a particular purpose in the husband’s mind—namely, his dislike of his wife’s entering that house—then the divorce is restricted by that purpose.
An example similar to this: a man says to his companion, “Enter my house for lunch,” and the companion replies, “By Allah, I will not enter your house.” He swore off entering his friend’s house due to a motive in himself—for example, because in the house there is a profligate man or an enemy. In that case, he does not break his oath if he enters after the profligate or enemy has left his friend’s house. Likewise one who swore, “I will not eat,” when his friend invited him to eat his food—he swore because he was satiated at that time, or because he saw the food to be scarce and swore out of consideration for his friend—if he eats at another time, he does not break his oath.
In the Sharḥ it states: “If one swore that his wife would not go out; she intended to go out, then paused for a while and went out—if it was her habit to go out, he does not break his oath; but if her habit was not to go out, he does break it.” End—by meaning.
And in the books of fiqh is what amounts to this: it is permissible for a seller to retract after offering (ijāb) and before acceptance.
On the basis of what has preceded: if this questioner suspended his wife’s divorce upon her entering So-and-so’s house, and that suspension was due to a matter like what we mentioned above, then her entering that house after the disappearance of the matter on account of which the divorce was uttered will not cause the divorce to take effect.
But if the suspension of divorce upon entering So-and-so’s house was absolute, without any intention or purpose besides the mere entering of that house, then divorce does fall upon the wife whenever she enters that house, at any time she enters it.
Another example falls under what has preceded: one says to his wife, “If you enter So-and-so’s house, you are divorced,” suspending her divorce upon a condition for a motive in himself—namely, that in that house there is an unvirtuous man given to harassing women. He did not suspend his wife’s divorce upon entering that house except because of that man who harasses women; nothing else occurred to him; nothing prompted what he said except that man’s presence; and he has no independent motive regarding the house itself—he only tied the divorce to it because of that man’s presence there. If that man dies, or moves from that house, or sells it and leaves, then the wife enters that house—the divorce does not fall upon her.
As for the answer to the last question—namely: is it valid to forestall a suspended divorce before its condition occurs?
We say: What I have seen in the scholars’ words about this is that retraction is valid by act, not by speech—such as selling the slave before the condition of his manumission (or a vow of it or a waqf upon him) takes effect.
Source : Min Thimār al-ʿIlm wa al-Ḥikmah vol.1